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ACCESSIBLE RELIABLE TAX ADVICE
Emily Cauble*
Unsophisticated taxpayers who lack financial resources are disadvantaged by a
shortage of adequate tax advice. The IRS does not have the resources to answer all
questions asked, and the IRS’s informal advice comes with no guarantee as to its
accuracy and offers the taxpayer no protection when it is mistaken. Furthermore,
non-IRS sources of advice have not sufficiently filled the void left by a lack of
satisfactory IRS guidance. These biases against unsophisticated taxpayers have
been noted by existing literature. This Article contributes to existing literature by
proposing several novel reform measures to assist unsophisticated taxpayers.
First, with respect to certain key provisions intended to benefit low-income tax-
payers, such as the earned income tax credit, Congress should act to provide
unsophisticated taxpayers the protection offered by more formal types of guidance.
In order to implement this first proposal, Congress should direct the IRS to verify
and stand behind the accuracy of tax software that addressed key provisions, such
as the earned income tax credit. The government would stand behind its guarantee
of accuracy in two respects. First, if a taxpayer provided accurate information when
operating the software and the software indicated, wrongly, that the taxpayer was
entitled to certain tax benefits, the IRS would not later assess additional tax liabil-
ity, interest, or penalties against the taxpayer. Second, if a taxpayer provided
accurate information when operating the software, the software indicated, wrongly,
that the taxpayer was not entitled to certain tax benefits, and the taxpayer discov-
ered this error after the typical limitations period for filing an amended return had
expired, then Congress would grant the taxpayer additional time to amend his or
her tax return to claim the benefits to which he or she was, in fact, entitled.
Second, this Article proposes that states should require that certified public ac-
countants either provide a minimum number of hours of pro bono services
annually or donate a minimum amount annually to support Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance sites. Third, Congress should implement a new procedure for assess-
ing penalties and interest against taxpayers whose incomes are below a certain
threshold. Under this new procedure, if the taxpayer’s return was prepared by a
paid preparer, any penalties and interest that would otherwise be assessed against
the taxpayer should be assessed, instead, against the preparer, unless the preparer
could prove either that he or she sought adequate information from the taxpayer
and tax consequences were reported correctly based on the information provided by
the taxpayer or that the taxpayer knowingly waived the right to have penalties and
interest assessed against the preparer. In addition, if a preparer did obtain a
waiver, the preparer would be precluded from offering any type of audit insurance
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(or, stated another way, if the preparer did offer any type of audit insurance, doing
so would nullify the waiver).
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INTRODUCTION
Given the complexity inherent in tax law, determining the tax
consequences of various events and preparing tax returns can be
onerous tasks for anyone. For taxpayers who possess financial re-
sources, ready assistance is available. For unsophisticated taxpayers
who lack financial resources, however, accessible and reliable tax
guidance is in short supply.
In some cases, sophisticated taxpayers might seek advice from
the IRS. For example, a sophisticated taxpayer might seek a private
letter ruling from the IRS. When existing tax authority does not
provide clear guidance regarding the tax consequences of a con-
templated transaction, a taxpayer may, in some circumstances,
request a private letter ruling. As a practical matter, only sophisti-
cated taxpayers obtain private letter rulings, in part because
applying for one is no simple matter. To obtain such a ruling, the
taxpayer must pay a filing fee and the taxpayer must prepare and
submit a detailed ruling request that describes all of the relevant
facts, the questions on which the taxpayer seeks a ruling, relevant
legal authority, and how the authority applies to the taxpayer’s
facts.1 A taxpayer who receives a private letter ruling can generally
rely upon it as long as the taxpayer provided complete and accurate
facts in the request. If the IRS later discovers that the ruling
reached an incorrect result because it was based upon the IRS’s
incorrect interpretation of legal authority, the IRS’s general prac-
tice is to not revoke the ruling retroactively.2
1. Rev. Proc. 2017-1, 2017-1 I.R.B. 1.
2. See Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(5) (as amended in 2002) (“Except in rare or unusual
circumstances, the revocation or modification of a ruling will not be applied retroactively
with respect to the taxpayer to whom the ruling was originally issued . . . if (i) there has been
no misstatement or omission of material facts, (ii) the facts subsequently developed are not
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Rather than seek advice from the IRS, a sophisticated taxpayer
might obtain an opinion from a tax expert which can, in some
cases, provide protection against penalties if the IRS later chal-
lenges successfully the tax consequences reported by the taxpayer.3
A sophisticated taxpayer who desires even more robust protection
might obtain transactional tax risk insurance from an insurance
company. If the IRS successfully challenges tax results claimed by
the taxpayer with respect to a specific transaction, transactional tax
risk insurance will reimburse the taxpayer for any resulting increase
in tax liability, interest, or penalties.4
For unsophisticated taxpayers who lack financial resources, the
task of accurately determining and reporting tax consequences is
much more daunting. For such taxpayers, the cost of seeking a pri-
vate letter ruling forecloses the possibility of obtaining such a ruling
as a practical matter.5 Therefore, if an unsophisticated taxpayer
who lacks financial resources obtains any IRS guidance, it is likely to
be informal advice, such as oral advice provided by an IRS represen-
tative via the IRS helpline.6
Although taxpayers can typically rely on formal advice such as
private letter rulings, taxpayers generally cannot rely on informal
IRS guidance.7 For example, a taxpayer might be informed by an
IRS helpline representative, incorrectly, that he or she can claim a
given tax credit. If the IRS later audits the taxpayer and assesses
additional tax liability, interest, and penalties, the taxpayer will not
materially different from the facts on which the ruling was based, (iii) there has been no
change in the applicable law, (iv) the ruling was originally issued with respect to a prospec-
tive or proposed transaction, and (v) the taxpayer directly involved in the ruling acted in
good faith in reliance upon the ruling and the retroactive revocation would be to his
detriment.”).
3. For recent discussion of the extent to which opinions offer protection against penal-
ties and for a proposal to limit this protection, see Calvin H. Johnson, Ending Reliance on Tax
Opinions of the Taxpayer’s Own Lawyer, 141 TAX NOTES 947 (2013). For discussion of how the
ability to rely on expert advice disproportionately benefits the wealthy, see, for example,
William A. Drennan, Strict Liability and Tax Penalties, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 28 (2009) (“An
exception for reliance on a tax advisor poses distributive justice problems because it greatly
benefits the rich. Tax advisors need to charge fees for their services, and rich taxpayers with
big tax dollars at stake are more likely than the working class or the poor to purchase tax
opinions to provide penalty immunity.”).
4. For further discussion of this insurance, see, for example, Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law
Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 388 (2005) (“The policies typi-
cally cover the amount of the tax deficiency as well as any interest and penalties that are
assessed up to the limits of the policy. . . . As do virtually all commercial liability insurance
policies, tax indemnity policies include a substantial deductible . . . .”).
5. In addition, the IRS will not address many of the types of questions asked by such
taxpayers in a private letter ruling. For further discussion, see Emily Cauble, Detrimental Reli-
ance on IRS Guidance, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 421, 464.
6. See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
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be able to rely on the informal advice received by phone to avoid
paying the underlying tax liability and interest.8 The taxpayer might
avoid paying penalties but only if the taxpayer can prove that he or
she reasonably relied on the advice.9 Similarly, an IRS helpline rep-
resentative might inform a taxpayer, incorrectly, that he or she
cannot claim a given tax credit. If the taxpayer later discovers that
he or she could have claimed the credit but makes this discovery
after the limitations period for amending his or her earlier return
has expired, the taxpayer will not be able to use reliance on the
IRS’s advice as a basis for obtaining extra time to amend his or her
return.10
When unsophisticated taxpayers who lack financial resources
look beyond the IRS for assistance, they fare no better. Some of
these taxpayers rely on Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites for
aid in preparing their tax returns.11 Many more utilize the services
of paid professionals.12 However, the advice provided by volunteers
and paid preparers is also prone to error.13 And while sophisticated
taxpayers may obtain transactional tax risk insurance that indemni-
fies them against all costs of mistaken advice (in particular,
penalties, interest, and underlying tax liability), the market does
not make available to unsophisticated taxpayers a similarly compre-
hensive option. Large commercial tax return preparers do offer
insurance.14 Typically, the insurance offered covers penalties and
interest if the IRS challenges the return because of a mistake made
by the return preparer.15 However, unlike transactional tax risk in-
surance, the insurance does not cover the additional underlying tax
liability assessed by the IRS.16 Furthermore, tax return preparers
may not always fulfill their promises to compensate unsophisticated
taxpayers for interest and penalties.17
Tax law is, by no means, alone in terms of benefiting wealthy
individuals. In many areas of law and of life, people possessing
greater financial resources will obtain superior advice and fare bet-
ter than their less wealthy counterparts. However, despite the
prevalence of societal advantages for sophisticated, wealthy individ-
uals, the existence of such preferences in tax law is especially
8. For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note 5, at 431–37.
9. For further discussion, see id. at 431–32.
10. For further discussion, see id. at 437.
11. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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problematic. Objections to the advantages that are bestowed upon
wealthy individuals by other areas of law are often met with the re-
sponse that redistribution should be relegated to the tax system.18
For example, those arguing for rules that facilitate economically ef-
ficient outcomes in contractual relationships will often contend
that the manner in which the benefit of a contract is divided be-
tween the parties need not be addressed by contract law because
any desired redistribution should be accomplished through the tax
system.19 Because other areas of law dodge criticisms of bias in this
manner, tax law must be less tolerant of bias against unsophistica-
ted individuals who lack financial resources.
The biases against unsophisticated taxpayers have been noted by
existing literature. This Article proposes several novel reform mea-
sures to assist such individuals. First, with respect to certain key
provisions intended to benefit low-income taxpayers, such as the
earned income tax credit, Congress should act to provide unsophis-
ticated taxpayers the protection offered by a private letter ruling. In
order to implement this proposal, Congress should direct the IRS
to verify and stand behind the accuracy of tax software that ad-
dressed key provisions, such as the earned income tax credit
(“EITC”), a tax credit designed to provide economic relief to the
working poor.20 The government would stand behind its guarantee
18. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role
of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 822–25 (2000);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667–68 (1994); David A. Weisbach, Should Legal
Rules Be Used to Redistributed Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 18, at 822–25;
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistrib-
uting Income, supra note 18, at 667–68; Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 106, 125 (2002); Weisbach, supra note 18, at 439.
20. A full discussion of the EITC is beyond the scope of this Article. For further discus-
sion of the EITC, see Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995); Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance
Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net, 81 OR. L. REV. 351 (2002) [hereinafter Book, Taxpayers
Caught in the Net]; Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the
Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103 [hereinafter Book, Preventing the
Hybrid from Backfiring]; Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t, and Those
Who Know Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT. TAX
REV. 113 (2014); Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits: Fixing
the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 461; Jonathan P. Schneller, The Earned
Income Tax Credit and the Administration of Tax Expenditures, 90 N.C. L. REV. 719 (2012);
Jonathan P. Schneller, Adam S. Chilton & Joshua L. Boehm, The Earned Income Tax Credit,
Low-Income Workers, and the Legal Aid Community, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 176 (2012); Susannah C.
Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 797–803 (2014); David A. Weisbach &
Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 997–1012
(2004); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1867 (2005).
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of accuracy in two respects. First, if a taxpayer provided accurate
information when operating the software and the software indi-
cated, wrongly, that the taxpayer was entitled to certain tax benefits,
the IRS would not later assess additional tax liability, interest or
penalties against the taxpayer. Second, if a taxpayer provided accu-
rate information when operating the software, the software wrongly
indicated that the taxpayer was not entitled to certain tax benefits,
and the taxpayer discovered this error after the typical limitations
period for filing an amended return had expired, then Congress
would grant the taxpayer additional time to amend his or her tax
return to claim the benefits to which he or she was, in fact, entitled.
Second, this Article proposes that states should require that certi-
fied public accountants either provide a minimum number of
hours of pro bono services annually or donate a minimum amount
annually to support Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites.
Third, Congress should implement a new procedure for assess-
ing penalties and interest against taxpayers whose incomes are
below a certain threshold. Under this new procedure, if the tax-
payer’s return is prepared by a paid preparer, any penalties or
interest that would otherwise be assessed against the taxpayer
should be assessed, instead, against the preparer. However, if the
preparer could prove either that he or she sought adequate infor-
mation from the taxpayer and tax consequences were reported
correctly based on the information provided by the taxpayer or that
the taxpayer knowingly waived the right to have penalties and inter-
est assessed against the preparer, then the IRS would not assess
against the preparer any penalties or interest owed by the taxpayer.
In addition, if a preparer did obtain a waiver, the preparer would
be precluded from offering any type of audit insurance (or, stated
another way, if the preparer did offer any type of audit insurance,
doing so would nullify the waiver).
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the obstacles
faced by unsophisticated taxpayers who seek advice from the IRS at
the tax reporting stage. Part II describes the barriers to obtaining
alternative sources of advice. Finally, Part III proposes and evaluates
reforms intended to assist unsophisticated taxpayers.
I. SHORTCOMINGS OF IRS GUIDANCE
An unsophisticated taxpayer who faces uncertainty about tax law
might turn to the IRS for assistance. Unfortunately, unsophisticated
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taxpayers who lack financial resources disproportionately seek in-
formal IRS guidance,21 upon which taxpayers cannot rely.22 Thus,
an unsophisticated taxpayer could be led astray by the IRS, and the
taxpayer, alone, would bear the risk of receiving faulty advice. Fur-
thermore, in recent years, the IRS has scaled back on the extent to
which it will provide informal advice at all. Therefore, unsophistica-
ted taxpayers’ prospects of receiving any IRS guidance are
dwindling.
Taxpayers generally cannot rely on informal IRS guidance, the
type of advice disproportionately sought by unsophisticated taxpay-
ers.23 The IRS answers a number of questions about tax return filing
received by phone. Taxpayers who call the IRS helpline could be
misled by either unduly favorable advice or unduly unfavorable ad-
vice. In either case, the taxpayer cannot use the guidance as a basis
for claiming relief.
Consider first a taxpayer who receives unduly favorable advice.
For instance, an IRS helpline representative might incorrectly in-
form a taxpayer that he or she is entitled to a particular tax credit
or deduction when, in fact, the taxpayer is not. The taxpayer com-
pletes his or her tax return relying on this advice and,
consequently, reports less tax liability than what he or she in fact
owes. During a later audit, the IRS discovers the error and assesses
additional tax liability plus interest and potentially penalties. The
fact that the taxpayer relied on advice provided by phone will not
immunize the taxpayer from the requirement to pay the underlying
tax liability and interest.24 The taxpayer might avoid paying penal-
ties but only if he or she can prove reasonable reliance on the
advice, a difficult task for an unsophisticated taxpayer.25 Moreover,
even the prospect of paying the underlying tax liability could be
quite detrimental to a taxpayer who has since made financial deci-
sions based on the assumption that his or her tax liability was
substantially lower.
A taxpayer who calls the IRS helpline could, instead, receive un-
duly unfavorable advice. For example, he or she might be
counseled to not claim a credit to which he or she is, in fact, enti-
tled. The taxpayer will then fail to claim the credit, reporting more
tax liability than what he or she in fact owes. The taxpayer might
later discover the error but not in time to amend the earlier tax
21. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note 5.
24. See id. at 431–37.
25. See id. at 431–32.
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return. If the taxpayer argues that the limitations period for filing
an amended return ought to be extended because his or her error
was induced by reliance on advice from an IRS employee, his or her
argument will almost certainly fail.26
Although taxpayers cannot rely on informal advice received by
phone, taxpayers generally can rely on more formal types of advice
such as private letter rulings. When existing tax authority does not
provide clear guidance regarding the tax consequences of a con-
templated transaction, a taxpayer may, in some circumstances,
request a private letter ruling.27 A taxpayer who receives a private
letter ruling can generally rely upon it as long as the taxpayer pro-
vided complete and accurate facts in their request for the ruling.28
If the IRS later discovers that the private letter ruling reached an
incorrect result because it was based upon the IRS’s incorrect inter-
pretation of legal authority, the IRS’s general practice is to not
revoke the ruling retroactively.29 Therefore, although the taxpayer
might be subject to less favorable tax consequences in future years
(if the transaction has ongoing tax effects), for prior years, the tax-
payer retains the benefit of tax treatment that is more favorable
than what a correct interpretation of tax law would have allowed.
But, as a practical matter, the cost of seeking a private letter ruling
forecloses the possibility of obtaining such a ruling for unsophistica-
ted taxpayers.30
While private letter rulings are not a viable source of guidance
for unsophisticated taxpayers, data indicates that lower-income tax-
payers may be more likely to utilize channels of informal guidance.
For instance, in a 2014 Taxpayer Attitude Study conducted by the
IRS Oversight Board, 88% of taxpayers with incomes between
$15,000 and $40,000 reported that they were very or somewhat
likely to use the IRS toll free telephone service, and 80% of taxpay-
ers with incomes equal to $75,000 or more reported that they were
very or somewhat likely to use this service.31 Regarding informal ad-
vice provided by IRS walk-in centers, 76% of taxpayers with incomes
26. See id. at 437.
27. Rev. Proc. 2017-1, 2017-1 I.R.B. 1.
28. Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity
in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323, 347–49 (2008).
29. See Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(5) (as amended in 2002).
30. In addition, the IRS will not address many of the types of questions asked by such
taxpayers in a private letter ruling. For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note 5, at 464.
31. IRS OVERSIGHT BD., 2014 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 14 fig.19 (2014), http://www.
treasury.gov/IRSOB/reports/Documents/IRSOB%20Taxpayer%20Attitude%20Survey%20
2014.pdf.
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between $15,000 and $40,000 reported that they were very or some-
what likely to use this service compared to only 63% in the case of
taxpayers with incomes equal to $75,000 or more.32
Moreover, the prospect of taxpayers suffering harm as a result of
receiving inaccurate, informal IRS advice is real because IRS gui-
dance provided via the IRS helpline is not infallible. In July 2005,
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) provided a re-
port to Congress on the quality of service provide by the IRS.33 This
report indicated that, for the 2005 filing season, IRS telephone as-
sistance accuracy was estimated at 87%.34 According to the same
report, this 13% error rate represented an improvement over the
prior year’s 24% error rate.35 In April 2001, the GAO provided a
similar report stating that, in 2000, the IRS estimated that it pro-
vided correct answers to questions about tax law received by phone
73% of the time.36 This 27% error rate, in turn, was lower than the
error rate in earlier years.37 Furthermore, recent cuts to the IRS’s
resources available for training employees may have an adverse ef-
fect on the quality of advice going forward.38 This is particularly
32. Id. at 13 fig.18.
33. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-782, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS NEEDS
BETTER STRATEGIC PLANNING AND EVALUATION OF TAXPAYER ASSISTANCE TRAINING (2005).
34. Id. at 1. The report does not describe the methodology for measuring IRS accuracy.
However, an earlier report explains that the IRS measures accuracy by placing anonymous
calls to the IRS telephone assistance line and monitoring the answers provided by IRS em-
ployees to a number of test questions. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-36, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: MONITORING THE ACCURACY AND ADMINISTRATION OF IRS’ 1989 TEST CALL
SURVEY 1 (1990). This earlier report notes some initial disagreement between the IRS and the
GAO regarding how to measure accuracy. Id. at 8. In particular, at least initially, the IRS
categorized certain responses as correct even when they were incomplete and potentially
misleading because the IRS representative had not asked sufficient questions to obtain all
information necessary to provide a correct answer. Id. at 6–8.
35. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 33, at 1.
36. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-189, IRS TELEPHONE ASSISTANCE: QUALITY OF
SERVICE MIXED IN THE 2000 FILING SEASON AND BELOW IRS’ LONG-TERM GOAL 2 (2001).
37. Id. These statistics provide a sense of the frequency with which taxpayers may receive
incorrect advice from the IRS helpline. They do not, however, indicate how often taxpayers,
in fact, follow incorrect advice when completing their tax returns. Cauble, supra note 5, at
427 (“Measuring the frequency of that occurrence is difficult because an examination of
litigated cases may not provide a complete picture –taxpayers may not raise reliance on infor-
mal advice as the basis for relief given that no relief will be granted. Nevertheless, the issue
has arisen in some cases.”) For further discussion, see, for example, Cauble, supra note 5, at
431–37.
38. For discussion of budget reductions, see 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., NATIONAL TAX-
PAYER ADVOCATE: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 21 (2013), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.
gov/userfiles/file/2013FullReport/IRS-BUDGET-The-IRS-Desperately-Needs-More-Funding-
to-Serve-Taxpayers-and-Increase-Voluntary-Compliance.pdf (“The IRS training budget has
been slashed from about $172 million in FY 2010 to about $22 million, a staggering 87 per-
cent reduction.”).
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true in light of the IRS’s increased workload resulting from newly
enacted tax legislation.39
Not only is informal advice unreliable, but the volume of infor-
mal advice provided is also dwindling. In 2012, for instance, the IRS
received approximately 109 million phone calls, and only 61% of
callers seeking to reach a customer service representative suc-
ceeded in doing so.40 In more recent years, the percentage of
callers receiving advice is even lower. According to the 2016 Na-
tional Taxpayer Advocate Report, for fiscal year 2015, the IRS
answered 38.1% of the approximately 101.5 million calls that it re-
ceived, and, in fiscal year 2016, the IRS answered 53.4% of the
approximately 104 million phone calls that it received.41 In addi-
tion, as highlighted by the 2014 National Taxpayer Advocate
Report, in fiscal year 2014 “the IRS significantly reduced core tax-
payer services it had long provided . . . . [I]t substantially stopped
answering tax-law questions from taxpayers, limiting the scope of
questions it answered during the filing season ending on April 15
and answering no tax-law questions at all after that date. It also ter-
minated its longstanding practice of preparing tax returns for
certain populations of taxpayers.”42
Finally, some might incorrectly assume that the IRS is unlikely to
audit lower-income taxpayers, and, as a result, such taxpayers do
not bear the cost of underreporting tax liability based on mistaken
IRS advice. The truth and this assumption, however, lie far apart
from each other. For instance, during 2000 to 2003, about half of
all individual income tax audits focused on EITC issues, even
though returns on which taxpayers claimed the EITC constituted
less than 20% of all individual income tax returns.43 More recently,
in 2010, about 37% of all individual income tax audits focused on
EITC tax returns, even though returns on which taxpayers claim
the EITC constituted 17% of all individual income tax returns.44
39. See Editorial Bd., Don’t Cheer as the I.R.S. Grows Weaker, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/opinion/dont-cheer-as-the-irs-grows-weaker.html.
40. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS, supra note 38, at 20.
41. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 43 (2016), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-
ARC/ARC16_Volume1_TaxpayerRightsAssessment.pdf.
42. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 6 (2014), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-
Annual-Report/TAXPAYER-SERVICE-Taxpayer-Service-Has-Reached-Unacceptably-Low-Lev
els.pdf.
43. Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1884–85 (2005).
44. Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax Injustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1173, 1195 (2013).
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When lower-income taxpayers are audited, their ability to suc-
cessfully respond to the audit is hampered by several factors. When
the IRS challenges the EITC claimed by a taxpayer, it typically does
so through a correspondence audit.45 In a correspondence audit,
the IRS will send a written request to the taxpayer seeking addi-
tional information and documentation. Because of a number of
practical barriers, EITC claimants often do not respond at all or
respond ineffectively to such requests. One such practical obstacle
is the fact that EITC claimants move frequently and, as a result, may
not receive correspondence from the IRS.46 In addition, if they do
receive it, they may not understand what documentation is re-
quired47 or may have a difficult time providing the necessary
documentation.48 For example, in the 2000 tax filing season, the
45. See, e.g., Book, Taxpayers Caught in the Net, supra note 20, at 374 (“The IRS audited
approximately 617,765 individual taxpayers in fiscal year 2000, with just over 237,500 taxpay-
ers in face-to-face audits at a taxpayer’s place of business or at an IRS office, and the rest
through the mail from an IRS Service Center in what is called a correspondence audit. Of the
380,204 correspondence audits, 325,654 of the correspondence audits related to EITC claims
investigated by the IRS, resulting in the IRS recommending hundreds of millions of dollars
in reversed EITC.”) (footnotes omitted).
46. See, e.g., Book, Taxpayers Caught in the Net, supra note 20, at 393 (“One of the biggest
issues affecting many low-income taxpayers and their relationship with the IRS is their ten-
dency to be transient or even temporarily homeless. Low-income taxpayers move often, and
may not leave forwarding addresses with the post office, or send a change of address to the
IRS.”) (footnotes omitted); Lipman, Access to Tax Injustice, supra note 44, at 1192 (“Not sur-
prisingly, low-income taxpayers—who . . . are much more likely to be transitory and working
irregular hours—are challenged to respond to IRS correspondence.”); Schneller, Chilton &
Boehm, supra note 20, at 188 (“For several important reasons, a mail-based audit system is ill
suited for low income taxpayers. First, EITC claimants are much more likely than other tax-
payers to be transient or homeless.”)
47. See, e.g., Book, Taxpayers Caught in the Net, supra note 20, at 396–401 (discussing barri-
ers to complying with correspondence audits including literacy issues and a lack of
understanding of the EITC); Drumbl, supra note 20, at 136 (“The Taxpayer Advocate Service
conducted a research study of ‘audit barriers’ to better understand EITC audit outcomes.
Among the interesting findings, the study revealed that the letters used in correspondence
audits were not clear to the recipients: more than 25% of the EITC taxpayers it surveyed ‘did
not understand the [Service] was auditing their return’; 39% ‘did not understand what the
[Service] was questioning about their EI[T]C claim’; and only 50% ‘felt they knew what they
needed to do in response to the audit letter.’”) (footnotes omitted); Lipman, Access to Tax
Injustice, supra note 44, at 1192 (“Even for sophisticated taxpayers, who are much more likely
to be represented by tax professionals, IRS correspondence is intimidating, inaccessible, and
confusing. Not surprisingly, low-income taxpayers—who are more likely to have language
barriers, basic literacy as well as financial literacy challenges, and are much more likely to be
transitory and working irregular hours—are challenged to respond to IRS correspondence.
In a study of EITC taxpayers, more than 70% stated that IRS examination correspondence
was difficult to understand.”) (footnote omitted); Schneller, Chilton & Boehm, supra note
20, at 188–89.
48. See, e.g., Book, Taxpayers Caught in the Net, supra note 20, at 395 (“Consider the chal-
lenges associated with attempting to prove a qualifying child’s residency, the most common
EITC error. Frequent moves may lead to documentation like school or medical records indi-
cating one or more addresses different than that on the tax return. Without further detailed
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IRS estimated that approximately 75% of EITC claimants who re-
ceived correspondence audits failed to respond or responded
inadequately to the IRS’s initial audit letter.49 By contrast, response
rates in face-to-face audits are much higher, yielding an 85%  re-
sponse rate by one estimate.50 If EITC claimants fail to respond or
provide insufficient documentation, they may not receive the bene-
fit of the EITC. In some cases, taxpayers may be denied the EITC
even when they were entitled to it. By one estimate, 25% of the
EITC claims that are denied as a result of correspondence audits
are wrongfully denied.51
The IRS’s approach to auditing EITC claimants could be con-
trasted with the more cooperative approach that it uses in dealing
with some sophisticated taxpayers. Perhaps bearing out the adage
that the squeaky wheel gets the grease, IRS efforts to engage in co-
operative regulation have focused on sophisticated taxpayers
because they are notoriously difficult to catch by traditional means.
For instance, in 2005, the IRS introduced the Compliance Assur-
ance Process (CAP), a program under which large businesses and
the IRS can resolve tax issues before taxpayers file tax returns.52 In
other words, instead of the IRS raising issues for the first time on
audit, the IRS and taxpayers who participate in the program can
explanation, this documentation would be insufficient to establish eligibility. In any event, an
explanation without documentation is not sufficient, as IRS examiners are instructed not to
accept, as proof, statements that are not accompanied by corroborating documentation.”)
(footnote omitted); Schneller, Chilton & Boehm, supra note 20, at 188–89.
49. Book, Taxpayers Caught in the Net, supra note 20, at 390 (“Of the roughly 325,000
taxpayers receiving EITC-correspondence audits in the 2000 filing season, the IRS itself has
estimated that almost 70% of the taxpayers chosen for an EITC correspondence examination
either fail to respond or respond inadequately to the IRS’s initial letter.”); cf. Lipman, Access
to Tax Injustice, supra note 44, at 1192 (“[T]he response rate to EITC correspondence exami-
nations is a low 30%.”).
50. Lipman, Access to Tax Injustice, supra note 44, at 1192 (“Alternatively, when EITC
examinations are conducted face-to-face, the IRS has achieved an 85% response rate.”).
51. Book, Taxpayers Caught in the Net, supra note 20, at 391 (“There is a growing aware-
ness that IRS compliance efforts are causing the IRS to prevent payment of or recover a
previously paid EITC to a significant number of otherwise eligible taxpayers. The current
National Taxpayer Advocate, speaking before her appointment, estimated that approxi-
mately twenty-five percent of taxpayers denied the EITC through IRS compliance actions are
in fact entitled to the EITC.”) (footnotes omitted). For another statistic suggesting that tax-
payers’ failure to respond to correspondence audits may result in wrongful denial of EITC
benefits, see Lipman, Access to Tax Injustice, supra note 44, at 1192 (“Notably, the 43% of
taxpayers who sought reconsideration of unfavorable EITC examinations and were successful
received, on average, 96% of the amount of EITC claimed on their original filing.”).
52. For further discussion of CAP, see, for example, Rachel Y. Holmes, Forcing Coopera-
tion: A Strategy for Improving Tax Compliance, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415 (2011); Susan Cleary
Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 961, 1012–13 (2006); Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About Responsive Tax Administration,
66 TAX L. REV. 121 (2012); Dennis J. Ventry, Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431
(2008).
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come to agreement on the tax treatment of transactions before tax
returns are filed.53 The program is part of an effort to use a less
adversarial and more cooperative approach to tax enforcement in
the hopes of improving tax compliance.54 The IRS’s change in ap-
proach is a reaction to the inability to deter sophisticated taxpayers
by traditional means, in part, because the IRS lacks the resources
and expertise to detect the aggressive tax strategies used by sophisti-
cated taxpayers.55
II. LACK OF ALTERNATIVES
As discussed above, when unsophisticated taxpayers need assis-
tance with their tax law questions, the IRS is not a promising source
for that assistance. Opportunities to receive IRS guidance have
been depleted in recent years, and even those taxpayers who do
receive answers from the IRS are not protected if the answers prove
to be inaccurate.
The IRS, of course, is not the only source of guidance about tax
law. Taxpayers may also seek assistance from other tax experts. Un-
fortunately, the plight of unsophisticated taxpayers who lack
financial resources is exacerbated because they also suffer from a
lack of access to equally good non-IRS sources of tax expertise. A
sophisticated taxpayer who plans to engage in a transaction and
does not want to seek a private letter ruling (or cannot do so be-
cause the IRS will not rule on the issues raised by the transaction)
can, instead, obtain a tax opinion from his or her tax counsel. If the
IRS later successfully challenges the claimed tax consequences, the
taxpayer will owe tax due but, at least in some cases, may be pro-
tected from owing penalties.56 If the taxpayer wants even more
protection, the taxpayer could obtain transactional tax risk insur-
ance—a product offered by insurance companies that reimburses a
taxpayer for not only penalties but also the underlying tax liability
53. See, e.g., Osofsky, supra note 52, at 132–36.
54. See id. at 122–23 (The program is part of “[t]he new, self-declared, IRS ‘revolution’
in large business tax administration” which is “characterized by a more extensive shift in
mentality, away from . . . [an] adversarial approach and toward cooperative compliance
partnerships”).
55. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 52, at 1422 (“[W]hen dealing with [Large Business Enti-
ties] in the current tax regime, direct enforcement efforts that rely on the traditional
deterrence model do not work. Low detection rates, combined with inadequate penalties,
and enormous information asymmetries, leave the IRS at a vast disadvantage in attempts to
restrain taxpayers from taking overly aggressive or abusive positions on their tax returns.”);
Ventry, supra note 52, at 456–57.
56. See Drennan, supra note 3, at 28; Johnson, supra note 3.
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due if the IRS successfully challenges tax consequences claimed by
the taxpayer with respect to a specific transaction.57
The non-IRS sources of guidance are more limited in the case of
unsophisticated taxpayers who lack financial resources. Many of
these taxpayers do utilize the services of paid professionals or Vol-
unteer Income Tax Assistance sites for aid in preparing their tax
returns. In 2001, 67% of lower-income taxpayers claiming the EITC
used paid preparers.58 The filing advice provided by these experts is
also not error-free. In order to provide a metric of the accuracy of
such advice, Professor Leviner studied compliance rates with re-
spect to various items reported on tax returns.59 The compliance
rates were determined by comparing items reported on the original
return with items determined by IRS auditors.60 In this study, Pro-
fessor Leviner found that the IRS adjusted the EITC claimed by
taxpayers 51% of the time when the return was prepared by the
taxpayer, 45.2% of the time when the return was prepared by a cer-
tified public accountant or attorney, 46.3% of the time when the
return was prepared by a large national tax preparation chain, and
46.9% of the time when the return was prepared by a Volunteer
Income Tax Assistance program or similar volunteer site.61 The
need to make adjustments could be caused by a number of factors,
including inadvertent error or unscrupulous behavior on the part
of a paid tax preparer who has an incentive to obtain a large refund
for the client so that the client will use other services provided by
the preparer.62 As a result of errors, taxpayers could lose out on tax
benefits (if the errors result in the taxpayer reporting too much tax
liability) or the taxpayer could owe an unexpected sum to the IRS
plus interest and penalties (if the errors result in the taxpayer re-
porting too little tax liability).
Furthermore, while sophisticated taxpayers may obtain transac-
tional tax risk insurance that provides protection against penalties
and underlying tax liability, a similarly robust option does not exist
57. See, e.g., Logue, supra note 4, at 388.
58. Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 20, at 1115; see also Lipman, The
Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits, supra note 20 (discussing the extent to which
lower-income taxpayers lose portions of the EITC because they must pay for assistance in
filing to claim it).
59. Sagit Leviner, The Role Tax Preparers Play in Taxpayer Compliance: An Empirical Investi-
gation with Policy Implications, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1079 (2012). For additional discussion of EITC
error rates in returns prepared by a paid preparer, see Michael A. O’Connor, Tax Preparation
Services for Lower-Income Filers: A Glass Half Full, or Half Empty?, 90 TAX NOTES 231 (2001).
60. Leviner, supra note 59, at 1085.
61. Id. at 1111 tbl.5.
62. See, e.g., Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 20, at 1139.
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in the case of unsophisticated taxpayers. Large commercial tax re-
turn preparers do offer some insurance either for an additional
charge or as part of their standard service package.63 The insurance
offered typically covers penalties and interest if the IRS challenges
the return because of a mistake made by the return preparer.64 Un-
like transactional tax risk insurance, however, the insurance does
not cover the additional underlying tax liability assessed by the
IRS.65 Furthermore, the tax return preparers may not always stand
behind the insurance provided. For instance, Jackson Hewitt, a
company that provides services to many lower-income taxpayers, of-
fers audit insurance as part of its standard service package.66 But
Better Business Bureau complaints and class action lawsuits suggest
that Jackson Hewitt may not always be responsive to customers
when they are audited and seek Jackson Hewitt’s assistance under
the terms of the audit insurance.67
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As discussed above, unsophisticated taxpayers who lack financial
resources are burdened by a shortage of adequate tax advice. The
IRS does not have the resources to answer all questions asked, and
the IRS’s informal advice comes with no guarantee as to its accuracy
and offers the taxpayer no protection when it is mistaken. Further-
more, non-IRS sources of advice have not adequately filled the void
left by a lack of sufficient IRS guidance. Therefore, in order to pro-
vide assistance to unsophisticated taxpayers, Congress and the states
should enact several reform measures.68
63. See, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 161, 176–77 (2008).
64. Logue, supra note 4, at 377 (“Conspicuously absent from the standard tax preparer
warranty is coverage for underpaid taxes. That is, they cover penalties and interest but not
the underpaid taxes themselves.”).
65. Id.
66. Lawsky, supra note 63, at 176–77.
67. Id., at 177–78.
68. Measures that have been proposed elsewhere could also assist unsophisticated tax-
payers. For instance, simplification of the substantive law governing the EITC could aid
taxpayers in their attempts to comply with the EITC’s requirements. For further discussion,
see, for example, Jonathan Barry Forman, Simplification for Low Income Taxpayers: Some Options,
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 183–84 (1996) (proposing various measures to simplify the EITC);
George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the
Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225, 267–74 (1994) (proposing various
simplification measures). In addition, other scholars have proposed instituting less adver-
sarial judicial proceedings to determine EITC-eligibility. See, e.g., Schneller, supra note 20, at
775–82; Schneller, Chilton & Boehm, supra note 20, at 202–03. Furthermore, other scholars
have proposed use of more cooperative and accessible audit procedures when challenging
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First, with respect to certain key provisions intended to benefit
low-income taxpayers, such as the EITC, Congress should act to
provide unsophisticated taxpayers the protection offered by a pri-
vate letter ruling. Second, states should require that certified public
accountants either provide a minimum number of hours of pro
bono services annually or donate a minimum amount annually to
support Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites. Third, Congress
should implement a new procedure for assessing penalties and in-
terest against taxpayers whose incomes are below a certain
threshold. Under this new procedure, if the taxpayer’s return is
prepared by a paid preparer, any penalties or interest that would
otherwise be assessed against the taxpayer should instead be as-
sessed against the preparer, unless the preparer could prove either
that he or she sought adequate information from the taxpayer and
tax consequences were reported correctly based on the information
provided by the taxpayer or that the taxpayer knowingly waived the
right to have penalties and interest assessed against the preparer. In
addition, if a preparer did obtain a waiver, the preparer would be
precluded from offering any type of audit insurance (or, stated an-
other way, if the preparer did offer any type of audit insurance,
doing so would have the effect of nullifying the waiver). Each of
these proposals is discussed below.
EITC claimants. See, e.g., Book, Taxpayers Caught in the Net, supra note 20, at 418–19 (“IRS-
generated publicity [of Low Income Taxpayer Clinics (“LITCs”)] could be especially helpful
in reaching taxpayers whose adjudications are conducted by correspondence. Because the
EITC is the most important substantive provision for low-income taxpayers as a class, it is a
natural fit for the IRS to encourage low-income taxpayers subject to compliance procedures
to use LITC services. Many states are required to advise welfare recipients of local legal ser-
vice organizations when they discontinue or reduce benefits. For example, Pennsylvania’s
state welfare regulations require that local legal service organizations’ names and addresses
be listed on many welfare notices. In its correspondence examinations, the IRS should pro-
vide a toll-free phone number that would allow taxpayers to determine if a local LITC
exists.”) (footnotes omitted); Schneller, Chilton & Boehm, supra note 20, at 200–02 (propos-
ing various ways to reform the procedures for auditing EITC claimants). Also, various reform
measures could be implemented to assist taxpayers who might be led astray by informal IRS
advice provided via the IRS helpline. For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note 5, at 429
(proposing that “first, the IRS ought to warn callers that they cannot rely on advice provided
by phone. Second, the IRS ought to refrain from assessing penalties against unsophisticated
taxpayers (perhaps using income as a proxy for sophistication) when they report items con-
sistently with IRS advice provided by phone. The IRS ought to do this on its own initiative
rather than waiting for the taxpayer to raise the phone call as a penalty defense. Third,
Congress should extend the limitations period for filing an amended return for a taxpayer
whose failure to file a correct return results from reasonable reliance on any form of advice
provided by the IRS.”).
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A. More Reliable IRS Guidance
Congress should act to provide unsophisticated taxpayers with
protection that is functionally equivalent to the protection offered
by a private letter ruling with respect to certain key provisions in-
tended to benefit low-income taxpayers, such as the EITC. As
discussed above, a taxpayer who receives a private letter ruling can
generally rely upon it as long as the taxpayer provided complete
and accurate facts in the request.69 In order to provide unsophisti-
cated taxpayers with the same type of protection, the IRS ought to
verify the accuracy of tax software that, at a minimum, addressed
the EITC and other key provisions intended to benefit low-income
taxpayers.70
This software, much like existing commercial tax return prepara-
tion software, would employ “skip logic” functionality—in other
words, it would route users through only questions that were rele-
vant given their answers to previous questions. In addition,
information available to the IRS from third party reporting could
be automatically included for the taxpayer to review and verify
rather than input independently.71
Some information would have to be supplied by the taxpayer. In
some cases, the IRS does not receive all of the relevant information
from third parties or from the taxpayer’s prior returns. For exam-
ple, information about which individuals constitute “qualifying
children” with respect to a taxpayer could be found only on a tax-
payer’s prior tax returns, and those returns might not provide
sufficient information because the relevant facts change from year
to year. Also, the taxpayer may not have filed a return in prior years
that included information relevant to determining the EITC be-
cause whether someone claims the credit can change from one year
to the next. For example, almost 30% of the taxpayers who claimed
the EITC in 2001 did not claim it in 2000.72 In addition, to compute
69. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
70. For recommendations that the IRS become more involved in verifying the accuracy
of tax return preparation software more generally, see, for example, Rodney P. Mock &
Nancy E. Schurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 443, 509 (2014) (“Thus, it seems
that the IRS should perform some kind of testing of the software to assess the risks of error in
the software. In the alternative, the IRS should hire third-party experts who can assess the
accuracy of the software in a comprehensive and systematic way.”); Joshua D. Rosenberg, A
Helpful and Efficient IRS: Some Simple and Powerful Suggestions, 88 KY. L.J. 33, 43–48 (1999).
Because the IRS might not have sufficient time before filing season to verify the proper im-
plementation of all relevant tax law changes, it might be necessary to limit the scope of the
software to the EITC and a small number of other key provisions.
71. For a similar recommendation, see Joseph Bankman et al., Using the “Smart Return” to
Reduce Tax Evasion, 69 TAX L. REV. 459 (2016).
72. See Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 20, at 1121.
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the EITC, the IRS would need information about the taxpayer’s
self-employment income that, in many cases, can be provided only
by the taxpayer.
This software would phrase all questions in plain language, and
any requirements that depend upon legal classification would be
broken down into their underlying factual components. For exam-
ple, a taxpayer may not claim the EITC if the taxpayer’s investment
income exceeds a threshold amount.73 For 2016 the threshold
amount was $3,400.74 Rather than asking, “Did your investment in-
come for 2016 exceed $3,400?” (which would require a taxpayer to
reach a legal conclusion as to whether or not different items of in-
come constitute “investment income”) the program might, instead,
state: “You earned the following items of income in 2016: (1) $7000
in wages or salary from Company B and (2) $6 interest income
from Y Bank. Other than the items of income listed above, did you
earn any additional income in 2016?”75 The software program
would determine that if all of the facts provided by the taxpayer are
true, the taxpayer is entitled to claim an EITC of $X. If all of the
facts are true, then the IRS cannot later challenge the taxpayer if he
or she claims an EITC of $X.
Schneller, Chilton & Boehm make a similar proposal regarding
the EITC.76 Their proposal involves implementing a “ReadyReturn”
system with respect to the EITC, where the IRS would use informa-
tion it possessed to prepare a draft return that it sent to the
taxpayer for the taxpayer to verify and revise as necessary.77 The
modification to their proposal made by this Article is the addition
73. I.R.C. § 32(i) (2012).
74. IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 596: EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) 5
(2016).
75. The requirements for an individual to constitute a “qualifying child,” similarly,
would be decomposed into underlying facts. Thus, the request would not state: “Bob Smith is
your qualifying child as defined in Section 152(c), determined without regard to paragraph
(1)(D) thereof and section 152(e).” The request would, instead, include facts such as “Bob
Smith is your son,” “Bob Smith lived with you for more than one half of 2016,” “Bob Smith’s
birthdate is June 6, 2011,” “Bob Smith is not married,” and so forth.
76. See Schneller, Chilton & Boehm, supra note 20, at 199.
77. Id. (discussing their proposal and describing the California “ReadyReturn” program
on which it is modeled). In a somewhat related vein, Schneller also proposed an optional
pre-certification process for taxpayers eligible for the EITC. Schneller, supra note 20, at 784.
Likewise, making a related proposal, Professor Forman argues,
If the government is truly interested in helping individual income taxpayers and in
simplifying the tax system, then the IRS should be allowed to directly assist taxpayers
in the preparation of their returns. In particular, it would make sense to let the IRS
prepare returns for those low-income taxpayers who claim the earned income credit.
Virtually all welfare programs help individuals apply for benefits, and the earned in-
come credit clearly provides a welfare-like benefit. Why not let the IRS prepare returns
so that eligible low-income individuals can claim their earned income credit refunds?
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of a private letter ruling-like guarantee. In particular, if all facts pro-
vided by the taxpayer or specified by the IRS and verified by the
taxpayer are correct, the IRS will not challenge the tax conse-
quences determined by the software if it turns out that the results
dictated by the software were incorrect in a manner that was unduly
favorable to the taxpayer. In addition, if the software provides a re-
sult that is unduly unfavorable to the taxpayer (indicating, wrongly,
that the taxpayer was not entitled to a given credit, for instance)
and if the taxpayer discovers the error after the expiration of the
typical limitations period for filing an amended return, the tax-
payer would be granted an extended period of time to file an
amended return.
Furthermore, the IRS should identify taxpayers who could con-
ceivably be entitled to the EITC based on the amount of income
earned by each taxpayer that is reported to the IRS by third parties.
Each year, the IRS ought to mail information to these taxpayers to
alert them to the availability of the software, and the IRS ought to
refer them to Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites that could
guide them through the software if they lack computer access or
other necessary skills to utilize it independently.78 This system
would not result in all eligible taxpayers receiving the EITC because
the IRS would not be able to reach all such taxpayers.79 However,
the system would increase access to the EITC for some taxpayers
and would provide taxpayers who claim the EITC with more
security.
Regarding feasibility, the upfront costs of implementing this pro-
posal, admittedly, would not be negligible. However, at least two
factors could help ameliorate the cost. First, once the initial system
Forman, supra note 68, at 177–78 (footnotes omitted). For further discussion of
ReadyReturn, see, for example, Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: The Califor-
nia ReadyReturn, 107 TAX NOTES 1431 (2005).
78. Congress might have to take action to assure the IRS that it is allowed to refer tax-
payers to specific Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites given that the IRS espouses the view
that government ethics rules prevent it from doing so. See, e.g., Schneller, Chilton & Boehm,
supra note 20, at 193–94. For a similar proposal regarding outreach by the IRS generally, see
Yin et al., supra note 68, at 264–65 (“The Service could also be required to increase its out-
reach efforts to the targeted population. It already provides EITC information to those tax
return filers who do not claim the EITC but appear to be eligible for it. Greater efforts,
however, could be made towards informing non-filers about the credit. For example, the
Service already communicates with millions of non-filers who, because of their low incomes,
likely owe no tax. It could send information about the EITC to those persons.”) (footnote
omitted).
79. For a discussion of the obstacles faced when trying to reach the population of tax-
payers entitled to the EITC, see, for example, Book, Taxpayers Caught in the Net, supra note 20,
at 393–405.
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and programs were put into place, the process could be largely au-
tomated. Second, the upfront costs might save costs later on by
streamlining the process of verifying EITC eligibility after taxpayers
have claimed the credit.
As to the merits of the proposal, one might question the value of
providing a private letter ruling-like guarantee.80 If the software is
correct, then the taxpayer will have reported the correct tax conse-
quences so the guarantee has no effect. However, even if the
software reaches the correct result, the guarantee could be valuable
because it may have provided an incentive to ensure that the
software does, indeed, yield accurate results. In addition, having a
guarantee will allow unsophisticated taxpayers to make financial de-
cisions without fearing that their tax liability could turn out to be
higher than the software indicated.
One might also object to this proposal on the grounds that, if the
result reached by the software is incorrect in a taxpayer-favorable
manner, allowing the taxpayer to rely on the software results in the
taxpayer receiving a windfall—in other words, a greater tax benefit
than what is granted by the substantive tax provisions adopted by
Congress. However, the same could be said under current law of
sophisticated taxpayers who obtain private letter rulings. Yet, tax-
payers are generally allowed to rely on rulings.
Allowing reliance on rulings might be justified for two reasons.81
First, the IRS has an opportunity to thoroughly review guidance
contained in a private letter ruling before issuing it. Second, given
the opportunity for thorough review, a private letter ruling that
reaches an incorrect result is likely to, nevertheless, reach a result
that is reasonable in light of existing authority. Taxpayers who
claim a result that is based on a reasonable interpretation of appli-
cable law are likely claiming a result successfully claimed by many
other taxpayers and, thus, their treatment cannot fairly be charac-
terized as a windfall. Given that the IRS would have adequate
opportunity to vet the software, the same arguments could support
allowing reliance on the results produced by the software.82
80. One might also argue that existing tax software already adequately addresses any
issues that would be addressed by this proposal. However, many unsophisticated taxpayers
may lack effective access to existing software. The proposed IRS-verified software would be
available through Volunteer Income Tax assistance sites, and the IRS would alert taxpayers to
the availability of the software.
81. For further discussion of the rationales that may justify greater reliance on some
forms of IRS guidance, see Cauble, supra note 5.
82. Furthermore, this Article proposes that Congress adopt rules allowing taxpayers to
rely on the software. Therefore, taxpayers who receive an unduly favorable result from use of
the software do not receive a greater benefit than what Congress intended.
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Furthermore, when the software does not yield accurate results,
the guarantee ensures that the cost of any error will not be borne by
a low-income taxpayer who is not in a position to bear such a cost.
Consider, for instance, a taxpayer who is incorrectly informed by
the software that he or she is entitled to a given tax credit. Assume
that the taxpayer relies on the software and claims the credit. If this
taxpayer is later audited, a requirement to pay a substantial addi-
tional sum to the IRS could be quite onerous in light of financial
decisions that the taxpayer may have made in the intervening time
period, such as signing a lease for a new apartment. In such a situa-
tion, it may be better for the cost of software error to be borne not
by this particular taxpayer, for whom the resulting consequences
would be quite dire, but instead by the public generally in the form
of reduced tax revenue.83
In some ways, this proposal could be viewed as a means of provid-
ing potential EITC claimants with the option of pre-certification. In
the realm of government spending programs, pre-certification is
the norm.84 In other words, before receiving many government
benefits, potential recipients must meet with a representative of the
relevant government agency and provide necessary information
and documentation. In the case of the EITC, taxpayers claim the
credit without any upfront verification on the part of the IRS, and
the IRS, instead, audits some claimants after the fact.
As others have observed, utilizing a mandatory pre-certification
process to implement the EITC would bring with it a number of
potential disadvantages. First, the rate of eligible taxpayers who
83. Furthermore, assuming the IRS outsources development of the software, the IRS
could, and should, agree contractually with the developer that the IRS would have a right of
recourse against the developer for any tax underpayments resulting from the software pro-
ducing results that were inconsistent with the description of tax rules provided to the
developer by the IRS.
84. See, e.g., Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1145, 1191–92 (2003) (“Other social service programs require greater upfront con-
tact between applicants and administrators. Consider, for example, the food stamp
application and recertification process. Households that may be eligible for food stamps typi-
cally apply at local offices. Applicants are required to supply detailed information about the
household, including its composition, expenses, income and assets. Administrators often ask
for verification of information in the application, often resulting in applicants visiting the
food stamp office more than once and often traveling to third parties (frequently other gov-
ernment offices) to get requested documentary evidence. The average application takes
approximately five hours of client time and results in out of pocket costs (largely transporta-
tion costs) of approximately $10.31.”) (footnotes omitted); Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1867
([“T]he administration of the EITC resembles that of the rest of the income tax, and differs
from that of other transfer programs, in that it is generally based on self-declared eligibility
rather than on a bureaucratic determination of eligibility prior to the making of payments.”).
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claim the EITC is higher than the participation rate by eligible ben-
eficiaries of some spending programs.85 For example, by one
estimate, the EITC participation rate is 89% of eligible individuals
while the Food Stamps Program participation rate is only 70% of
eligible individuals.86 Some have attributed this higher participation
rate to the lack of mandatory pre-certification in the case of the
EITC, arguing that pre-certification carries with it stigma and other
costs that discourage participation.87 Second, the cost of administer-
ing the EITC is lower because the IRS does not have to individually
85. Schneller, Chilton & Boehm, supra note 20, at 182 (“[T]he EITC boasts a higher
participation rate than other social programs that provide support for low-income families.”);
Tahk, supra note 20, at 829 (“[P]oor individuals are more likely to file tax returns to get
benefits than to apply for benefits through other agencies.”); see also Book, The Poor and Tax
Compliance, supra note 84, at 1192 (“For example, between 1994 and 1997, with a greater
emphasis on national food stamp quality control largely revolving on increased recertifica-
tion vigilance, national food stamp participation fell from 71% to 62.5%, and, by 1998 among
working families, food stamp participation hovered at approximately 50%. Among all eligible
households that failed to participate in the food stamp program, approximately 15% cited
the costs of participation as the most important factor.”).
86. Schneller, Chilton & Boehm, supra note 20, at 182.
87. See, e.g., Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance, supra note 84, at 1190–91 (“Prescreening
or precertifying EITC eligibility raises some rather difficult issues. [E]xpansion of the certifi-
cation program will likely entail significant taxpayer costs. First, the relatively high EITC
participation rates are dependent, in part, upon the simplicity of tax return filing and the
lack of stigma that accompanies other benefit programs’ application process. Certification
may place additional burdens on taxpayers, which may result in decreased participation and
possibly higher costs associated with receiving the EITC.”); Schneller, Chilton & Boehm,
supra note 20, at 182 (“Scholars generally attribute this increased participation rate to the
EITC’s use of self-certification, which does away with time-consuming and potentially humili-
ating visits to welfare offices. However, it should be noted that there is a lack of empirical
work definitely connecting the EITC’s pre-certification regime to its participation rate: it is
possible, for instance, that the EITC enjoys high levels of participation because it targets low-
income workers, who may be more likely to have the skills and initiative to apply for benefits
than do those who are both destitute and unemployed.”); Tahk, supra note 20, at 828–29
(“Another commonality of anti-poverty tax programs is that they carry less social stigma than
nontax programs. To procure a benefit that derives from any of the provisions of the tax
code, a benefit-seeker merely files his annual tax return and then receives a refund (insofar
as he is eligible). In contrast, most direct-spending programs require participants to fill out a
separate application with a distinct agency and (in many cases) to undergo an interview or
some other prescreening process. The relative absence of stigma with tax-based anti-poverty
measures is due to the fact that almost every citizen at some point in his or her life has to pay
taxes or file returns. A low-income taxpayer who primarily uses the tax system to get benefits
has the same experience of a higher-income taxpayer. Both fill out the same form, often with
help from a return preparer, both hope to get a large refund, and both likely get at least
some refund. . . . Perhaps because filing for tax benefits is less stigmatizing, poor individuals
are more likely to file tax returns to get benefits than to apply for benefits through other
agencies.”); Yin et al., supra note 68, at 252–53 (“The EITC program does not involve any
bureaucracy that the claimant must encounter face-to-face in order to obtain the bene-
fit. False Finally, the pool of EITC eligibles must all be in the labor force to receive the
benefit, and therefore may be a little better educated and have a little greater familiarity with
available government benefits than those eligible for other government transfer programs
for the poor. For these reasons, expectations for the rate of EITC participation should be
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certify every taxpayer’s eligibility.88 The potential advantage of pre-
certification is that it could increase accuracy—fewer ineligible tax-
payers would claim the EITC and face potential hardship when the
EITC was later denied.89
This Article’s proposal can be viewed as an attempt to harness
the advantages of pre-certification while mitigating its disadvan-
tages. In particular, by effectively giving taxpayers the option to
seek pre-certification, taxpayers who choose to do so can avoid the
risk of a later denial. In addition, by automating the process of pre-
certification, this proposal mitigates the administrative costs of pre-
screening taxpayers. Finally, the fact that the process does not in-
volve face-to-face meetings and the fact that it is optional90 may
reduce any resulting stigma and thereby avoid any dampening ef-
fect on participation rates.
B. Pro Bono Requirements
As proposed above, Congress should provide unsophisticated tax-
payers the protection offered by a private letter ruling with respect
to certain key provisions intended to benefit low-income taxpayers,
such as the EITC. In particular, Congress should require the IRS to
verify the accuracy of tax software that, at a minimum, addressed
ambitious.”); Zelenak, supra note 20, at 1887–88 (“Precertification may be quite effective in
preventing overpayments, but it may also lead to substantial underpayments as eligible per-
sons are discouraged from applying by the time and effort required of them.”).
88. See, e.g., Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance, supra note 84, at 1190–91 (“Prescreening
or precertifying EITC eligibility raises some rather difficult issues . . . [including] a likely
significant increase in the government’s administrative costs,”); Drumbl, supra note 20, at
122–23 (“On the other hand, the costs for administering the benefits are also disparate. The
CBO cites the example of SNAP as having . . . an administrative cost that is more than 9% of
the total cost of the program. In contrast, . . . the cost to administer the [EITC] . . . is less
than 1% of the total cost of the EITC to the government”) (footnotes omitted); Schneller,
Chilton & Boehm, supra note 20, at 182 (“[A]nother putative advantage of self-certification is
the EITC’s relatively low administrative costs when compared to traditional welfare
programs.”).
89. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 20, at 122–23 (“[B]ecause other spending programs
have more direct contact with their recipients, their overpayment rates are much lower than
the Service’s overpayment rate. . . . The CBO cites the example of SNAP as having a typical
overpayment rate of less than 5% . . . . In contrast, the EITC has an estimated overpayment
rate of approximately 25% . . . .”).
90. For a similar observation, see Schneller, supra note 20, at 784 (“Thus, the use of
intake centers for the EITC could substantially alter the face of the program and help ad-
dress many existing problems. Needless to say, such a proposal may have uncomfortable
implications for those who value the EITC’s decentralized reliance on self-certification. How-
ever, if such an effort were undertaken with attention to the EITC’s programmatic goals, it
would not necessarily undermine self-certification. Such offices could serve as optional,
rather than mandatory, means for interested taxpayers to receive assistance in composing a
tax return that accurately reflects their income and family circumstances.”).
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the EITC and other key provisions intended to benefit low-income
taxpayers. Taxpayers who use this software should be immune from
later challenge by the IRS if all of the information supplied by the
taxpayer is accurate and complete. The IRS should identify taxpay-
ers who could conceivably be entitled to the EITC based on the
amount of income earned by each taxpayer that is reported to the
IRS by third parties. Each year, the IRS ought to mail information
to these taxpayers to alert them to the availability of the software
and their potential eligibility for the EITC.
These reform measures alone will not ensure that all eligible tax-
payers receive the benefit of the EITC because some eligible
taxpayers will lack computer access or other necessary skills to util-
ize the software independently. Therefore, many EITC claimants
will need to rely on expert advice for assistance in using the
software.
Currently, only a small fraction of low-income taxpayers utilize
free tax return preparation services provided by Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance sites. By one estimate, only slightly more than 2% of
individual income tax returns were prepared by a Volunteer In-
come Tax Assistance site or similar service in 2012.91 Many EITC
claimants turn, instead, to paid preparers. For instance, in 2001,
67% of lower-income taxpayers claiming the EITC used paid
preparers.92 Thus, low-income taxpayers lose a portion of the eco-
nomic benefit of the EITC by paying third parties in order to
receive it. As Professor Lipman observes, “Tax practitioners exact
significant fees and costs for providing these services. . . An esti-
mated $1.75 billion of the EITC intended to benefit low-income
working families and their neighborhoods has been shifted to prof-
itable paid tax practitioners.”93
Furthermore, those taxpayers who do obtain free assistance
through Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites may receive mis-
leading advice. As an indicator of the accuracy of the advice
received, Professor Leviner found that the IRS adjusted the EITC
claimed by taxpayers 46.9% of the time when the return was pre-
pared by a Volunteer Income Tax Assistance program or similar
volunteer site.94
91. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 20, at 124.
92. See Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 20, at 1115; see also Lipman,
The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits, supra note 20 (discussing the extent to
which lower-income taxpayers lose portions of the EITC because they must pay for assistance
in filing to claim it).
93. Lipman, The Working Poor Are Paying for Government Benefits, supra note 20, at 466–67.
94. Leviner, supra note 59, at 1111 tbl.5.
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To increase the availability and, potentially, the quality of free
advice, states should require that certified public accountants either
provide a minimum number of pro bono service hours annually or
donate a minimum amount each year to support Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance sites.95 Such requirements would increase the availa-
bility of free tax return preparation assistance. In addition, to the
extent that certified public accountants provided pro bono services,
the requirements might increase the quality of free service by in-
creasing the level of expertise of those providing free advice.
Improved accuracy is certainly not guaranteed, however, available
data contained in a study by Professor Leviner suggests that accu-
racy might improve.96 In particular, when studying the relative
accuracy of returns prepared in different ways, Professor Leviner
found that the accuracy rate of returns prepared by certified public
accountants was slightly greater than the accuracy rate of returns
prepared by Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites. Specifically,
while the IRS adjusted the EITC claimed by taxpayers 45.2% of the
time when the return was prepared by a certified public accountant
or attorney, the IRS adjusted the EITC claimed by taxpayers 46.9%
of the time when the return was prepared by a Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance program or similar volunteer site.97 In addition, Pro-
fessor Leviner found that the dollar amount of the errors on
returns prepared by certified public accountants were lower than
the dollar amount of the errors on returns prepared by Volunteer
Income Tax Assistance sites. In particular, the weighted average
change to the EITC claimed on returns prepared by certified public
accountants or attorneys was $497, compared to $539 for returns
prepared by Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites and similar ser-
vices.98 Moreover, to the extent that some errors currently made by
certified public accountants represent intentionally aggressive re-
porting positions driven, in part, by a desire to compete for client
business, it is possible that such errors would be less likely to arise
when services were provided free of charge.
95. This proposal could complement proposals for increased government funding of
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites. For such a proposal, see Lipman, The Working Poor Are
Paying for Government Benefits, supra note 20, at 469 (“A fourth solution to the loss of anti-
poverty benefits for the working poor is to fund government sponsored volunteer income tax
assistance (VITA) programs.”). A similar requirement for lawyers may be desirable for other
reasons—in particular, to increase the availability of legal representation for low-income indi-
viduals more generally. However, such a proposal is not the focus of this Article given that it
would likely have only a small effect of the availability of tax return preparation services.
96. Leviner, supra note 59.
97. Id. at 1111 tbl.5.
98. Id. at 1110.
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C. New Penalty Procedures
Low-income taxpayers might rely less on paid tax return
preparers if they had access to IRS-vetted software that addressed
key provisions such as the EITC and if the supply of volunteer in-
come tax assistance increased because states required certified
public accountants to provide pro bono services or financial sup-
port to Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites. Even if these
proposals were implemented, however, some low-income taxpayers
nevertheless would utilize the services of paid tax return preparers.
Many paid preparers dispense accurate advice and stand behind
any audit insurance that they provide. However, experience has
shown that some low-income taxpayers are exploited by unscrupu-
lous paid tax preparers who take overly aggressive reporting
positions in order to obtain large refunds for their clients so that
their clients use other services provided by the preparers.99 In addi-
tion, although many paid prepares will offer insurance that covers
penalties and interest resulting from IRS challenges, some
preparers might not always honor claims made under those insur-
ance policies.100
In order to protect low-income taxpayers from harms caused by
unethical paid preparers, Congress should implement a new proce-
dure for assessing penalties and interest against taxpayers whose
incomes are below a certain threshold. Under this new procedure,
if the taxpayer’s return is prepared by a paid preparer, any penal-
ties or interest that would otherwise be assessed against the taxpayer
should be assessed, instead, against the preparer, unless the
preparer could prove either (1) he or she sought adequate infor-
mation from the taxpayer and the tax consequences were reported
correctly based on the information provided by the taxpayer or (2)
the taxpayer knowingly waived the right to have penalties and inter-
est assessed against the preparer.101 In order to demonstrate that he
99. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
101. Implementing this new procedure in the context of the EITC would require some
additional tinkering with the types of penalties that are assessed. In particular, under Internal
Revenue Code Section 32(k), in some cases, a taxpayer will be precluded from claiming the
EITC for some period of time as a penalty for improperly claiming the credit, due to either
fraud (in which case the time period is 10 years) or reckless or intentional disregard of the
rules and regulations that does not rise to the level of fraud (in which case the time period is
2 years). I.R.C. § 32(k) (2012). In order to implement a procedure under which penalties
could be assessed against the preparer, Congress could eliminate the penalties contained in
Section 32(k) and rely upon monetary penalties instead. Alternatively, Congress could re-
quire that the preparer would pay a monetary amount estimated to be the present value
equivalent of the penalties that would be borne by the taxpayer under Section 32(k), and the
taxpayer could then claim the EITC notwithstanding Section 32(k) as long as the amount
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or she sought adequate information from the taxpayer, the
preparer would be required to show that the taxpayer attested to all
relevant facts phrased in plain language. Preparers could not meet
the necessary burden by showing that taxpayers attested to legal
conclusions.102 For example, a taxpayer may not claim the EITC if
the taxpayer’s investment income exceeds a threshold amount.103
In 2016, for instance, the threshold amount that would prevent
claiming the EITC was $3,400.104 Rather than stating, “My invest-
ment income for 2016 did not exceed $3,400,” the representation
signed by the taxpayer might, instead, state: “I earned the following
items of income in 2016: (1) $7,000 in wages or salary from Com-
pany B and (2) $6 interest income from Y Bank. Other than the
items of income listed above, I earned no additional income in
2016.”
The new penalty procedure would apply unless the taxpayer
knowingly waived the right to have penalties and interest assessed
against the preparer. In order to prove an effective waiver, the
preparer would be required to supply a written waiver separately
signed by the taxpayer that explained, in plain language and in con-
spicuous writing, the effects of signing the waiver. If a preparer does
obtain a waiver, the preparer would be precluded from offering any
type of audit insurance (or, stated another way, if the preparer did
offer any type of audit insurance, doing so would have the effect of
nullifying the waiver).
This new procedure would offer several advantages. First, it
would effectively result in automatic enforcement of the audit in-
surance typically offered by many preparers. Under current law,
when a low-income taxpayer is audited, that taxpayer must contact
his or her preparer to insist upon coverage under the terms of the
audit insurance provided. This task could be difficult because the
taxpayer may be unaware of the existence or terms of the coverage.
In addition, if the low-income taxpayer lacks sufficient bargaining
power, the preparer may be unresponsive or unhelpful. In such a
situation, the low-income taxpayer would be required to take the
further onerous step of seeking legal representation in an attempt
to obtain payment or pursue similarly burdensome options in an
claimed did not exceed, in present value terms, the monetary penalty that had been assessed
against the preparer.
102. In a similar vein, Circular 230 requires that tax practitioners providing written tax
advice may not rely upon representations of their clients when doing so would be unreasona-
ble. 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(a)(2)(iv) (2017).
103. I.R.C. § 32(i) (2012).
104. IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 596, supra note 74, at 5.
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attempt to persuade the preparer to honor the terms of the insur-
ance, such as filing a complaint with the Better Business Bureau or
otherwise drawing public attention to the preparer’s shortcomings.
Under the procedure proposed by this Article, the IRS would auto-
matically enforce the terms of the insurance in the course of
auditing the taxpayer. Some preparers may choose to not offer au-
dit insurance. Under the new procedure, that option would
continue to be available because such preparers could obtain writ-
ten waivers from their clients.
Second, assuming that the taxpayer provided complete and accu-
rate information and the preparer did not obtain a waiver, the new
procedure has the effect of placing the return preparer, rather than
the low-income taxpayer, in the position of contesting penalties as-
sessed by the IRS. Given the preparer’s greater tax expertise, the
preparer likely could be in a better position to contest unjustified
penalties. By contrast, the taxpayer, who lacks tax expertise, might
simply accept any penalties assessed without challenge even when a
defense to penalties would be available.105 Furthermore, it is not the
case that the IRS refrains from assessing penalties against low-in-
come taxpayers. By one estimate, in 2000, the IRS assessed penalties
in connection with approximately 17,300 deficiency notices involv-
ing the EITC.106
Third, assuming the preparer has not obtained a waiver, the
preparer, rather than the low-income taxpayer, would be subject to
penalties and interest if the mistake resulted from the preparer’s
failure to seek complete information from the taxpayer. This fea-
ture of the proposal is advantageous because, given the complexity
of the requirements for eligibility for the EITC and other tax cred-
its and deductions, the return preparer will oftentimes be better
positioned than the taxpayer to know what information is rele-
vant.107 Placing the burden upon preparers to solicit relevant
information will provide the incentive to obtain the information to
105. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 20, at 115 (“[F]or all of these reasons—lack of experi-
ence, lack of knowledge, and relative lack of education—the taxpayer is unlikely to have the
knowledge or resources to raise the very defense [against penalties] that is meant to protect
an unsophisticated taxpayer.”); id. at 147 (“[T]he reasonable cause defense presents a conun-
drum for the very taxpayers it is meant to benefit: if one is inexperienced, has little to no
knowledge of tax law, and has relatively little formal education, how would that person know
to invoke the reasonable cause defense?”).
106. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 20, at 148 (quoting TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., NATIONAL
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 90 (2001)) (citing the statistic that,
in the year 2000, the IRS “issued approximately 17,300 EITC deficiency notices involving
accuracy-related penalties”).
107. For a somewhat similar proposal involving information gathering, see Book, Prevent-
ing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 20, at 1109 (proposing “shifting additional
compliance costs to commercial tax-return preparers in the form of heightened reporting
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the party who is capable of doing so and will penalize the party who
is blameworthy when the information is not obtained.
Imagine that a low-income taxpayer seeks the assistance of a paid
preparer at tax time. As part of the tax return preparation process,
the preparer incorrectly determines that the taxpayer can claim a
given credit. The preparer neglects to ask probing questions that
would have revealed facts indicating ineligibility for the credit, and
the taxpayer does not spontaneously volunteer the information be-
cause he or she is unaware of its relevance. Relying on the
preparer’s advice, the taxpayer claims the credit, reducing his or
her tax liability significantly.
Two years later, the IRS sends the taxpayer a notice indicating
that the taxpayer improperly claimed the credit and now owes the
IRS additional tax liability plus interest and potentially penalties.
Under current law, the burden of the underpaid taxes, interest and
penalties would fall upon the taxpayer. Under the proposed new
procedure, the preparer would be liable for the interest and penal-
ties, assuming the preparer did not obtain a waiver from the
taxpayer. Given the preparer’s superior knowledge of the require-
ments for claiming the tax credit, the preparer was better able than
the taxpayer to avoid the error by making more thorough inquiries.
Therefore, the preparer, rather than the taxpayer, ought to bear
the cost of the mistake.
Several objections to the new procedure might be raised. How-
ever, the procedure is designed to mitigate each of the potential
concerns. First, one might express the concern that the procedure
simply reverses the parties’ positions—as a result of the new proce-
dure, we will see paid preparers being exploited by unscrupulous
low-income taxpayers rather than low-income taxpayers falling vic-
tim to unethical paid preparers. In particular, taxpayers might
game the system by providing misleading information to preparers
or pressuring preparers to take overly aggressive reporting posi-
tions, knowing that the preparer, rather than the taxpayer, will bear
any resulting penalties. The new procedure, however, is designed to
prevent this type of manipulation by taxpayers. If the tax results are
reported accurately based on information provided by the taxpayer,
the taxpayer, rather than the preparer, owes any resulting interest
and penalties. Therefore, taxpayers who provide misleading infor-
mation to their preparers will continue to be responsible for paying
and due diligence rules”); id. at 1146 (“[I]ncreasing the requirements on preparers to in-
quire, record, retain, and report information—while significantly raising the penalty for
failing to do so—has the potential to address all three sources of errors [preparer dishonesty,
taxpayer dishonesty, and preparer incompetence].”).
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interest and penalties. In addition, if a taxpayer does pressure a
preparer to take an overly aggressive reporting position, the
preparer can refuse to do so, or the preparer can do so only on the
condition that the taxpayer signs a waiver so that the preparer
avoids liability for any penalties or interest that would otherwise be
assessed against the taxpayer (although the preparer would still be
subject to any applicable preparer penalties).
Second, one might question the effectiveness of the new proce-
dure. In particular, one might speculate that it will not actually
assist low-income taxpayers because paid preparers will simply pass
increased costs on to taxpayers by raising their tax return prepara-
tion fees. In order to address this concern, it is helpful to observe
that the new procedure merely results in automatic enforcement of
the audit insurance already offered by many paid preparers, and
those preparers who do not offer audit insurance can avoid the new
procedure by obtaining waivers from their clients. Therefore, to the
extent that the new procedure results in any change, it merely has
the effect of enforcing audit insurance policies that already exist.
In the case of preparers who already intend to honor their audit
insurance policies, the fees currently charged should already incor-
porate the associated insurance premium, and fees should not
increase merely because the insurance will now be enforced. If a
preparer does not intend to honor its existing insurance policies,
the fees currently charged might not include the full amount of the
associated insurance premium, and such preparers might increase
their fees once the insurance policies become automatically en-
forceable. However, clients of such preparers will still be better off
as a result of the change. They might pay marginally higher fees,
but they will receive all of the services that the preparer purports to
offer in exchange for the fees that are charged.
Third, one might predict that the new procedure will have no
real effect because paid preparers will routinely obtain waivers from
their unsophisticated clients and resort to offering whatever terms
they traditionally offer. The new procedure, however, is designed to
protect taxpayers from this possibility. First, a waiver would only be
effective if it was separately signed by the taxpayer and explained, in
plain language and in conspicuous writing, the effects of signing
the waiver. Thus, taxpayers would be protected from the possibility
of unknowingly granting waivers. Second, if a preparer did obtain a
waiver, the preparer would be precluded from offering any type of
audit insurance (or, stated another way, if the preparer did offer
any type of audit insurance, doing so would have the effect of nulli-
fying the waiver). Thus, preparers could not ask taxpayers to waive
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the preparers’ liability while, at the same time, purporting to offer
audit insurance that they have no intention of honoring. If a
preparer offers audit insurance, the preparer is unavoidably subject
to automatic enforcement of the insurance. As a result, the
preparer’s clients will receive what they believe they have paid to
obtain.
CONCLUSION
Unsophisticated taxpayers suffer from an inability to receive satis-
factory tax advice. Informal advice provided by the IRS, the type of
advice that unsophisticated taxpayers disproportionately seek, is
generally not reliable, and alternative sources of advice are also in-
adequate. To remedy the failings of the current system,
unsophisticated taxpayers should be provided with the protection
offered by private letter rulings with respect to certain key provi-
sions, which benefit low-income taxpayers, such as the Earned
Income Tax Credit. In addition, states should require that certified
public accountants either provide a minimum number of hours of
pro bono services annually or donate a minimum amount each year
to support Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites. Finally, Congress
should implement a new procedure for assessing penalties and in-
terest against taxpayers whose incomes are below a certain
threshold. Under this new procedure, if the taxpayer’s return is
prepared by a paid preparer, any penalties or interest that would
otherwise be assessed against the taxpayer should be assessed, in-
stead, against the preparer—unless the preparer could prove either
that he or she sought adequate information from the taxpayer and
tax consequences were reported correctly based on the information
provided by the taxpayer or that the taxpayer knowingly waived the
right to have penalties and interest assessed against the preparer. If
a preparer obtained a waiver offering any type of audit insurance
would nullify the waiver.
